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KOSOVO AND METOHIJA IN THE AFTERMATH OF
THE WAR – SOCIAL AND SECURITY PARAMETERS1
The purpose of this paper is to summarize the most important parameters in key spheres
of life in Kosovo and Metohija. Post-1999 Kosovo appears to be a field of numerous challen-
ges and pitfalls for all actors: international community, Albanians and Serbia. Twelve years af-
ter the termination of war in and the establishment of international protectorate, Kosovo and
Metohija stands confronted with numerous problems, primarily relating to unsustainable eco-
nomy, high rates of many forms of crime, and insufficiently developed institutions, and it can
be generally characterized as an anomic, post-war society. The paper is based on secondary
analysis of available research, and the data from international and Albanian institutions. 
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Introduction
Kosovo and Metohija (KiM), covering an area of 10,908 km2 with around 1,7
million inhabitants, has been for years an object of intense interest for politicians, mi-
litary strategists, intelligence agencies, media and, somewhat less, the scientific com-
munity. At the moment, this region is ethnically homogenous, with about 88 % Alba-
nian population. The minority population in Kosovo includes Serbs (6 %), Bosniaks,
Goranis (2 %), Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians (RAE) (1.5 %), Turks (1 %) and others (e.g.,
Croats) (IOM, 2008). Almost 43 % of the population is below the age of 19, with the
population growth rate (1.3 %), and population density (193 inhabitants per kmІ) ra-
tes estimated to be the greatest in Europe (SOK, 2009). 
For decades, the region of Kosovo and Metohija has been a conflict area. A radi-
cal difference exists between the ethnic Albanians who strive to form an independent
state by separating themselves from Serbia, and Serbia the territorial integrity of which
deeply grafts on Kosovo and its historical place in the Serbian identity. The opposition
of the two communities created by this difference has caused that the pattern of nati-
onalism, myth-making and revenge has taken on a seemingly permanent character
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peration and development in Serbia and the region in the 19. i 20. centuries“, financed by the Ministery of
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(Knudsen and Laustsen, 2006). Regarding the contemporary stage of the old conflict
of interests in Kosovo, it is necessary to say that the Kosovo Albanians started to ma-
nifest their political dissatisfaction soon after the death of J. B. Tito. Mass demonstra-
tions of that dissatisfaction started in the 1980s with open demands for establishing a
seventh Yugoslav state for Kosovo. Marking the entire decade, this dissatisfaction and
claim eventually resulted in the intervention by the Yugoslav federal police force and
the proclamation of the state of emergency by the Serbian government authorities. As
Troebst (1998) concisely described the situation of those days: during the following
years when inter-ethnic tension in Kosovo rapidly increased, the non-Serbian republics
of Yugoslavia allowed Serbia to independently resolve the issue. This caused the Ko-
sovo Albanian radicals turn to a new interpretation of the slogan “Kosovo Republi-
ka”— independent Kosovo Albanian state. Subsequently, the Albanian nationalist mo-
vement was intensified aiming at winning the full attention of the international factors.
The police intervention did not solve the conflict but only expanded it further. In
the late 1990s (1998-1999) a military conflict between the Serbian government autho-
rities and Albanian nationalists started again, soon reaching a level that lead the NA-
TO militarily intervene by attacking Serbia. The NATO aggression took part between
March 24th and June 10th, 1999, ending with a peace treaty of a classified content that
was presented in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. By the provisions of this
act, the Province of Kosovo and Metohija was temporarily excluded from the admini-
stration of the Republic of Serbia and placed under the UN supervision. The political
resolution outlined in the Resolution assumed that the UN mission (UNMIK) would
be established there in order to “provide an interim administration for Kosovo under
which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy … and which will provi-
de transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful
and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo” (UNSC, 1999). It is publicly known that
the UNMIK, soon after its formation, began to breach these provisions. 
According to the Resolution, all legal acts of the Republic of Serbia would apply
in Kosovo and Metohija except those that are inconsistent with the generally accepted
legal norms. Also, the Resolution 1244 specifies that after the withdrawal of the Ser-
bian forces, “an agreed number of the Serbian personnel would be allowed to return”.
This staff was intended to have the following functions: keep in touch with the inter-
national civil mission and international security forces, marking / sweeping mine fi-
elds, be present at the Serbian historical sites and key border crossings. Until today, not
a single member of the Serbian security forces or administrative staff has ever retur-
ned to the region, even thirteen years after the promulgation of Resolution 1244. UN-
MIK has not offered any explanation for this violation of Resolution 1244. A notion
that its consistent implementation might cause regional instability and endanger the
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peace seems to be considered a tacit excuse which fully meets the aspirations of the
Albanian nationalists whose ideology of “Greater Albania“ was further encouraged in
the years that followed, threatening to expand the conflict to the south of central Ser-
bia and Macedonia.
Within their mission, UNMIK enacted a number of rules and regulations and al-
so ratified laws adopted by Kosovo Parliament. In 2001, they announced a Constituti-
onal Framework for a provisional self-government, which defined the range of self-go-
verning institutions on a provisional level (PISG): the Assembly of Kosovo, that would
elect a President of Kosovo, the Government with a Prime Minister, and the Judicial
system of Kosovo. UNMIK fulfilled its mandate through four pillars, each one of them
managed by a different organization. Civil administration: UNMIK (UN), Humanita-
rian assistance: UNHCR (UN), Institution-building: OSCE; and Economic reconstruc-
tion: EU. The precarious security situation resulted in a new assertion that without in-
troducing military as a stabilizing force, UNMIK would not have been able to start
operations. Thus its military presence continues to play a vital role, as the maintenan-
ce of law and order is essential for UNMIK to perform its duties (Srbjerg, 2006). By
introducing a special military force (KFOR) as a support to the civil mission, a kind
of total trusteeship operation type was established. 
The provisional administration’s eight year supervision ended in February 2008
when the Kosovo Parliament proclaimed independence of Kosovo from Serbia. What
was the reason for the western support of the Kosovo independence in the circumstan-
ces when the region was still far away from reaching the imposed legal and political
standards? It can be presumed that this was done through the anticipations of the In-
ternational Crisis Group Report made in 2007 (ICG, 2007) about a possible scenario
in the case of delaying of Kosovo independence: By the end of that year, the Kosovo
Albanian leaders would be under a seemingly irresistible internal pressure to declare
independence, with or without any external support. Without the support Kosovo wo-
uld fracture: with Serbia reclaiming the land north of the Ibar River, the Serbs fleeing
from Kosovo, and the eight years of internationally guided institution-building being
lost. The implosion would consequently destabilise the neighbouring countries, and the
pressure would further increase along ethnic lines. The influx of refugees would qu-
ickly affect the EU and the impact of the disorder would further enhance crime net-
works already organized in the Balkans for the distribution of heroin to Europe, and
illegal migration, especially of women who represent nearly 30 per cent of internatio-
nal sex trade. 
Hence, the very decision to support the Kosovo Albanians’ independence decla-
ration does not rely on the maturity of the situation for restoring the new status, but is
rather seen as a means to prevent a possible conflict escalation. Two months after dec-
laring independence, the Kosovo Parliament adopted a constitution and the transfer of
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mandate from the UN to the institutions of the newly formed state began. The activi-
ties of Kosovo institutions were to be supervised by EU, which established its mission
EULEX (the EU’s biggest ever European security and defence policy - ESDP opera-
tion) in December 2008, with the mandate to assist in building the Kosovo’s capaciti-
es. 
The evaluation of several years of the protectorate in Kosovo requires an analy-
sis of the UN mission’s success in solving the most important problems they dealt
with. Some of the dilemmas/challenges were: how to develop an effective, inclusive
and accountable local government; how to construct an educational system capable of
fostering integration and development instead of ethnic separation and exclusion; how
to reconstruct the province and, at the same time, avoid renewed ethnic and internati-
onal strife over its future; how to counter crime and dysfunctional aspects of the libe-
ral economic reform, and how to handle the specific challenge of Kosovo’s future sta-
tus (Kundsen and Laustsen, 2006: 1-18). 
How difficult was to reach these objectives can be seen from the problems that
currently arise in a varying intensity and significantly burden the key segments of so-
cial life. The obstacles are listed in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and La-
bor 2008 Report: deaths and injuries from unexploded ordnance or landmines take
place; corruption and government interference in security forces and the judiciary;
lengthy pre-trial detentions and a lack of judicial process; cases of politically and et-
hnically motivated violence; societal antipathy against the Serbs and the Serbian Ort-
hodox Church; lack of progress in repatriating internally displaced persons; govern-
ment corruption; violence and discrimination against women; trafficking in persons,
particularly girls and women for sexual exploitation; societal violence, abuse, and di-
scrimination against minority communities; societal discrimination against persons
with disabilities; abuse and discrimination against homosexuals; and child labor in the
informal economy. (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009)
Currently, the Kosovo Parliament has 120 MPs. While 100 are directly elected,
10 places are reserved for the Serbian and 10 for other minority communities (UNDP
Kosovo, 2005). Analyzing political life and distribution of political power, it is easy to
note that party membership is of a key importance for social affirmation. The work of
political and social institutions is very complex due to a strong network of traditional
social division and the tribal loyalty. Political life in Kosovo has little in common with
the usual mechanisms of political struggle: first of all, the strongest political party is
led by the former soldiers who derive their popularity and influence from their parti-
cipation in the 1998-9 guerrilla war against the Serbian government. In addition, its
usual ways of “political“ actions are murder, blackmail, threats, and robbery, which
means that political power is not lost or gained in the elections and through other pro-
cedures of the regular political system, but it rather depends on a multitude of perso-
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nal, family (clan), and regional structures that are always ready to use violence in or-
der to corroborate the persuasiveness of their “political“ programs (ICG, 2005; ICG,
2006).
As the state of affairs in political life is described by Albanian analysts, “The ho-
pe embraced in international administration that democracy could be established by
administrative fiat is erroneous. Quite on the contrary ... citizens who have long been
expecting democracy, and see the present reality being portrayed with rosy colors, ha-
ve already started to show signs of fatigue and frustration with democracy. The crea-
tion of such a distance between the citizens and their representatives, as well as of the
government, further exacerbates the already widespread views of corruption and pa-
tronage.” (KIPRED, 2006a)
From the standpoint of the population’s religion, the area of Kosovo and Metohi-
ja is one of the most heterogeneous in Europe. The majority of Albanians inhabiting
the area of eastern Kosovo belong to the Sunni (so-called orthodox) Islam, whereas the
Sufi Islam, whose each individual tarikat (dervish order) constitutes a separate religi-
ous framework, is widespread in the western part. In my doctoral research conducted
during the 1990s, I have found 9 dervish orders active in Kosovo (Đurić, 1997). Hi-
storical data indicate a traditional presence and influence of the Bektashi order (in the
1950s, the seat of the Bektashi order was moved from Tirana, Albania, to Đakovica,
Kosovo), while other tarikats also gained power around the same period. Kosovo Al-
banians also belong to the Christian denominations (predominantly Roman Catholic,
a minor number Orthodox), while the activity of the Protestant Church has also been
recorded in the recent years.
To date, the religious heterogeneity of the Kosovo Albanians and its impact on the
quality of their social life has not been studied in detail. In such a discrete and closed
community, it is difficult to even plan a systematic research on this issue, because, in
their contacts with other faiths and foreign researchers, Albanians laconically claim
that the “Religion of Albanians is Albanian-ness“ and that they have succeeded in
overcoming religious differences within their community by means of developing a
strong national spirit. It is obvious that more significant changes (in terms of religiou-
sness becoming stronger), that would require a substantial follow up in a sufficient to-
picalization and research, have occurred recently (Djuric, 2005). In the past couple of
years, a large number of new Islamic religious buildings is being built all over Koso-
vo, Islamic religious schools are enrolling students by a massive proportion, and more
and more obvious external signs of Islam being reinforced can be seen in the streets:
a rich supply of religious books in bookstore windows, and a growing number of
young people wearing traditional Islamic clothes in order to show their attachment to
the faith. Male followers of the Wahhabi movement are increasingly seen with charac-
teristic beards and short-legged trousers. During the recent mass protests organized by
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the Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, and southern Serbia on various occasions, expli-
cit symbols and iconography showing their close relation to Islam have been frequently
displayed. 
Based on the analysis of basic social parameters, it can be preliminary conclu-
ded that Kosovo is a typical post-conflict society. In such a complex and challen-
ging environment, disorganized for several past decades, no prompt development
can be expected. Any more definite conclusion on the international forces’ impact
there will certainly have to take into account that these premises, as well as the fact
that their effort to create, maintain and facilitate socio- economic development is
taking place in a recently conceived country where cleptocracy is still in power
(Dobovšek and Eman, 2008).
1. Present study, goals, sources and data
Since the main purpose of this paper is not to consider the reasons that led the
international community make the above-described decisions (aggression on FR
Yugoslavia, the establishment of the protectorate, and then the support to the unila-
teral declaration of independence), here we shall make an overview of the key in-
dicators of the Province’s social life, and especially its security status after the esta-
blishment of the protectorate. In particular, this paper will focus on selected deve-
lopments that took place after 1999, when the international community decided to
help Kosovo develop into a sovereign state. In this respect, our analysis presents an
attempt to evaluate the efforts of the international community without reasoning
the soundness of these actions.
Systematic research of the Kosovo’s post-war development (or post-1999) has
multiple significance. Besides its practical importance, it provides a rare opportu-
nity for social scientists to analyze the practices of international intervention, pea-
ce-building and the reconstruction of societies torn by war, but, especially impor-
tant, it can serve as a ground for a wider comparative analysis, for other countries
where different types of protectorate have been established, such as Bosnia, East
Timor, Afghanistan or Iraq.
A detailed and reliable statistics undoubtedly constitutes the basis on which
the profile of a community is being built, the condition is assessed in separate do-
mains of social life and societal plans are created. However, in Kosovo today, the-
re are almost no objectively systematized indicators, neither is there any single
aspect of its social life, all posing a great challenge to any extensive research acti-
vity (Brown, 2009). As an illustration from a study on the Kosovo’s economics
(Bradley and Knaus, 2004), within the Kosovo government, too, there is no unique
estimation of the vital statistical data. This results in that the documents of the Mi-
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nistry of trade and industry propose that Kosovo is inhabited by 2.4 million of pe-
ople, while the Ministry of Environment and Regional Planning makes up a new
general plan on the basis of an estimate of 2.2 million of inhabitants. This is, among
other things, the consequence of the fact that any official population survey in Ko-
sovo has not been conducted from 1981 to 2012, and all the statistical presentati-
ons have been estimations extrapolated from this survey action 28 years ago. Sum-
marizing this unfavorable condition, the authors of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities Report cite severe limitations of statistical office’s infrastructu-
re, human and financial resources (CEC, 2006). 
It is interesting to see how erroneous social- demographic estimates function
in real aspects of Kosovo’s social life. For example: before the last elections of De-
cember 2011, the Central Election Commission of Kosovo officially stated that the
final number of voters was 1,630,636. If we take into account that, according to the
demographic estimates made by the provincial institutions, nearly 43% of the po-
pulation is under the age of 19 (SOK, 2009), so many voters could lead to the con-
clusion that there were more than 2.7 million residents in Kosovo. However, a cen-
sus made only a few months later (April, 2012) showed that the total population of
Kosovo and Metohija was 1.7 million. If we consider the mentioned estimates abo-
ut the percentage of younger population once again, we may wonder how the lists
of voters, which contained nearly half a million of non-existent voters were created,
and what the regularity of the elections was according to such voting lists.
Additionally, any serious academic effort to elucidate some problem in the
post-1999 Kosovo resides in the shade of an impeded access for researchers, tradi-
tional closeness of the Albanian community, as well as of authorized international
institutions. Here we must point out that modern social science remains quite unin-
terested in any attempt to publicize papers that are, even remotely, critical about the
current situation in this area. This is especially true for scientific analyses of the
Serbian social researchers, who are customarily seen as lacking objectivity in dea-
ling with the problem of Kosovo and Metohija. The thematization of the situation
in Kosovo and Metohija, the international community’s performance evaluation,
and the perspective of multi-ethnic life happen predominantly in an ideological sur-
rounding of the defense of the established political and social status. For this rea-
son, we decided that this overview of the main parameters of social life in the post-
war Kosovo and Metohija will derive solely from the Albanian and international
data sources. Consequently we will check whether a “non-Serbian“ data and analy-
ses can support the widely justified optimism about the “scientific prediction“ of
good prospects in Kosovo and Metohija’s further development , as well as the po-
sitive evaluations of the international community engagement.
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In compliance with the mentioned above, the data used in this paper originate
from the regular yearly reports of the USA Office in Priština, appropriate docu-
ments and reports of UNMIK police, KFOR, OSCE, USAID, as well as from the
timely reports of International Crisis Group, the analyses of UNDP for Kosovo
(United Nations Development Program in Kosovo), the research of Institute for war
& peace reporting (IWPR), The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN),
Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), analyses and
reports of researchers and academicians, of the Albanian press, my own surveys in
Kosovo from 2000 to 2010 and a series of conversations with Albanian and inter-
national officials .
2. Economic instability
The widely established goal of the economic development of the post-1999
Kosovo, formulated at the first donors' conference in 1999, “restoration led by pri-
vate sector and long-term growth”, judging by all the accessible indicators, has not
been accomplished. According to expert analyses, the economy of Kosovo is often
classified as a non-sustainable, artificial, mostly managed and supported by finan-
cial resources from the international community, donors and diaspora (USAID,
2003). After the termination of war activities, a short-termed reconstruction boost
was recorded, induced by the influx of significant reconstruction funds, then follo-
wed by a drastic fall of estimated public expenditures from 6.3 billion euro in 2000
to 3.1 billion euro in 2003 (Government of Kosovo, 2003). Underdevelopment of
domestic industries and their international non-competitiveness caused the enor-
mous disparities between the import and real export (mostly timber, scrap metal
and mushrooms) (SOK, 2009; The World Bank, 2007). It is estimated that the ave-
rage real growth of the GDP in the five-year period 2002–2007 has been ca. 1.5
percent (The World Bank, 2007) and that such a decelerated growth was a conse-
quence of a combined impact of small investments and the retirement of internati-
onal forces from Kosovo. The decrease of donors' aid, accompanied by the reduc-
tion of international military and civil presence, obstacles in privatization, lack of
investments, are all conditions that “converted the short post-war boom into a post-
war crisis” (Bradley and Knaus, 2004: 8).
Private sector activities are concentrated around commerce and services. That
is, effective agents are primarily small low-budget enterprises in the domain of tra-
de and civil engineering. The hard macro-economical situation is additionally ag-
gravated by extremely unfavorable electro-energetic situation in Kosovo, being the
consequence of a chronic insufficiency in investment and the inconvenient system
conditioning. According to a document of the Kosovo Ministry of energetics and
mining: “The current technical situation of the energy capacities and their techno-
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logical level does not guarantee reliable supply and competitive to fulfill consumer
demand now and specifically not the anticipated increased demand.” In the past ten
years, the consumer structure has significantly changed in Kosovo: participations of
households and services have increased from 26 % to 75 % respectively, from 7 %
to 13 % whereas the industry percentage has decreased from 67 % to 12 %. The
electricity consumption for heating comprises 64.2 % of the supplied electricity,
therefore creating a huge load during the winter season; see “Energy Strategy of
Kosova 2005–2015” (MEM, 2005: 8).
Particularly significant as a social issue is, surely, the low rate of employment
of the younger generations and the appraisals that the available economical capaci-
ties cannot absorb intensely growing labor force in near future. Kosovo has the
youngest population in Europe, and it is estimated that 36,000 youth enter the la-
bor market each year (UNMIK, 2004a). The actual situation is only a continuation
of the tendencies extant from the several past decades there. Analysts of the former
Yugoslavia had already observed in 1970's that Kosovo made an exception in view
of the other parts of the country, “...in which [it] cannot, even under a most optimi-
stic assumption and even if the plan’s growth targets are achieved, it cannot be ex-
pected to absorb the increments to its labor force” (Schrenk, Ardalan, Tatawy,
1979). The real number of labor-seeking persons can hardly be ascertained, and ac-
cording to the World Bank’s estimation, 40 % of the working contingent is unem-
ployed (The World Bank, 2007: 5). Since the official status of the “unemployed”
does not imply any privilege, it is arguably supposed that the figure of the really
unemployed is much higher than the number of persons registered in job finding
institutions. Also, a large number of the labor force is engaged part-time and at un-
registered jobs. Judging by the latest available analysis of the labor market (SOK,
2008: 13), it seems that in 2007 approximately only 40 % males capable for work
were employed, while females were rated only at 13 %. By some estimations (CEC,
2006), female employment condition is considerably worse, and the combination of
women’s low participation and high unemployment rates leads to an extremely low
employment rate – only up to 10 %.
In a study prepared for the Albanian controlled government of Kosovo that
functioned in “exile” (i.e. in parallel to the official Serbian structures of the 1990s),
an estimation was elaborated for Albanian immigrants to European countries.
Among the total sum of conjectured 217,000 immigrants, the greatest number wor-
ked in Germany (82,348) and Switzerland (72,448), then in Sweden (15,652),
Austria (12,300), Croatia (9,087), Italy (5,472), Slovenia (4,977), Belgium (4,137),
Norway (3,522), Denmark (3,314), France (1,998), Netherlands (1,078) etc. (Bla-
ku, 1995: 10). The channels for their economic emigration into European countri-
es, mostly to Germany and Switzerland, have been significantly closed after 1999.
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According to some estimations, more than 100,000 Albanian immigrants have been
repatriated from Germany only after 1999.2 This consequently affected a practice
previously held by the Kosovo Albanian families who would send at least one of
their members to work abroad in order to enable stable financial support for the en-
tire family back home. 
In the presented context of the post-war Kosovo’s economic life , it is of no wan-
der that the World Bank's appraisal claims that about 45 percent of the population in
Kosovo is poor, with another 18 percent being vulnerable to poverty (The World Bank,
2007). The poverty is significantly more spread among larger and rural families, whe-
re members are usually unemployed and less educated. The current macro-economic
conditions do not predict an optimistic future. Industrial production has not been recu-
perated, and the expected influx of direct foreign investments has failed as the conse-
quence of undefined property relations. Kosovo is inhabited by 60 % with rural popu-
lation, and agriculture is its most important activity. Albeit with a significant share in
GDP, the agricultural production has remained underdeveloped, with a low level of
productivity (MAFRD, 2006), mainly addressed to the satisfaction of the proper ne-
eds of one household. In such an ambient, a balance between enormous needs for in-
vestment and social priorities is hardly achieved, above all in the domain of protection
of the poor population of Kosovo. In that sense, we can agree with Albanian analysts
who contend, “The discrepancy between demographic trends and the development of
the economy in Kosovo constitutes a structural threat to the long term security in Ko-
sovo.”(KIPRED, 2006b)
It can be considered that in the past few years, some economic problems have
been suppressed in the background. All recent public opinion polls have placed the
high focus of Albanians on the final solution of Kosovo status in the foreground as well
as the Albanian’s urge for independence that is expected to constitute an adequate con-
text for a quick resolution of their main social problems. But, after the establishment
of independence, that focus, expectedly, has moved towards the increasing dissatisfac-
tion with the growing economic disasters and inefficiency of the local institutions.
Thus, the latest surveys dating from April 2009 (UNDP Kosovo, 2009), show the dec-
rease of trust in all the key institutions: the government, the parliament, KFOR, KPS,
UNMIK, the courts, the president, the prime minister. Now, unemployment (46 %),
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2 With the deportation of the Albanian working population to Kosovo after 1999, the external finan-
cial aid, which a great deal of rural population had used for living, has significantly decreased; see Euro-
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(Berlin–Istanbul, September 18, 2006). Such a treatment on the part of those European countries that or-
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poverty (18 %) and the lack of electric power (9 %) are highlighted as the main pro-
blems, and the ever greater number of Albanians (92 %) locate the culpability for the
poor economic situation on the Kosovo government, instead of on the UNMIK. On the
other hand, the absence of elementary indications of economic life improvement ma-
kes the social condition additionally worse. It can be legitimately assumed that the dis-
satisfaction, in the new situation of realized political aspirations, will continue to grow.
The cited investigation (UNDP Kosovo, 2009) except for the growth of economic pes-
simism also marks the increase in percent of those who are willing to protest for eco-
nomic reasons (79 %). 
3. Security condition: too many providers, too low security
One of especially important duties of the United Nations Interim Administrative
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) following the termination of the war was to establish a
new security structure and provide a secure and safe ambient for all the citizens of Ko-
sovo. It meant, first of all, disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration, as it counts,
about 50,000 former members of paramilitary Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and
the establishment of a new, peace security structure. 
For several years, the security sector has been under the exclusive competence
(jurisdiction, powers) of the international administration – the United Nations Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The inclusion of dome-
stic institutions into the regulation and administration of this domain begun in 2005
with the Internal Security Sector Review process. By the end of 2005, PISG establis-
hed two new ministries, the internal affairs and justice. With the independence decla-
ration of Kosovo and the acceptance of Constitution during 2008, legal conditions we-
re created for the establishment of new institutions which would be led by the Kosovo
politicians by now: Kosovo Security Council (KSC), the Kosovo Security Force
(KSF), and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA). As foreseen in the Comprehensive
Status Proposal (Peci, Dugolli, Marmullakaj, 2008), these new institutions are control-
led by KFOR, the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), and the International Civilian
Office (ICO), . 
3.1. The security architecture of post-war Kosovo
The post-war Kosovo security architecture is complex, consisting of local:
KPS and KPC/KSF and international: UNMIK-police/EULEX and KFOR forces.
Each of these organizations underwent through different transformation process,
while there is no cooperation and coordination between these institutions that wo-
uld result in effective practice. Such a dispersed structure of the security forces has
been additionally complicated by the long-standing rivalries between the intelligen-
ce agencies, numerous domestic and international private security companies and
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attempted security activities of numerous paramilitary groups. We will describe
briefly the genesis and the activities of each of these formations.
The Kosovo Police Service (KPS, http://www.kosovopolice.com) was created
in 1999 as a professional, impartial and politically neutral police service. The main
role and responsibility for the recruitment and instruction of KPS police officers
was held by OSCE that created another institution – the Kosovo Police Service
School, aiming at training a multi-ethnic police force. By 2005 some 7,500 police
officers passed the training there, and since 2006 this school evolved into the Ko-
sovo Center for Public Safety Education and Development. Now the Center functi-
ons as a domestic advanced institution and covers education and training needs of
the police, border, corrections, fire and rescue services. The OEBS Mission still
provides its support in gathering programs for all public security institutions, and
since 2006 it has helped the establishment of the Kosovo Police Inspectorate which
serves as a mechanism of internal control that conducts investigations upon com-
plaints against police officers. The training course for the police officers means in-
teractive teaching in groups composed of members from different ethnic groups.
Within this course, students are trained for a wide domain of police information and
skills: patrol duties, use of force and firearms, criminal investigations, evidence
gathering, traffic control, first aid, applicable laws and interviewing techniques.
KPS currently employs more than 7,000 staff members and is organized along
three main lines: operations (including public order, border police and special po-
lice units); crime (major crimes, criminal intelligence and organized crime); and
administration (administration services, training and support services) (Dugolli and
Peci, 2005). 
The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC, http://www.tmk-ks.org) was created in
September 1999 as “a civilian emergency service agency, the tasks of which shall
be to: provide disaster response services; perform search and rescue; provide a ca-
pacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas; assist in de-mining; contribute
to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.” (UNMIK, 1999). Its membership
was initially composed largely of the Kosovo Liberation Army veterans. Ordinan-
ce of the UN special envoy for Kosovo stipulate that the KPC should consist of
3,000 active and 2,000 reserve members. Only 200 out of total 2,000 pieces of in-
fantry armory designed for the needs of KPC is in use, while the rest of 1,800 is
kept in the KFOR storage. Members of the KPC are wearing uniforms that are al-
most identical to those of the KLA. In January 2009, the transformation of KPC and
the formation of the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) began with 2,500 permanent
members and 800 in reserve. Initially, it consisted of the Land Forces Command,
the Rapid Reaction Brigade, the Operations Support Brigade and the Training and
Doctrine Command (MKSF-KS, 2008).
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The UNMIK police (http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol) served as a law en-
forcement unit composed of police officers of more than fifty nationalities with two
strategic goals: to provide temporary law enforcement and to establish and develop
a local police (KPS). Commentators who have closely observed UNMIK’s opera-
tions have pointed out how the UN mission due to the lack of clear goals, a lack of
organizational integrity, and serious challenges from competing and cunning local
forces who believed that they had more political legitimacy than the international
mission (Cohen, 2006). The following are cited as important shortcomings of this
mission: the existence of various decision-making centers, a limited level of self-
control mechanisms, a great cultural and national diversity of the contingent, and
an oversized bureaucratic apparatus (Balcer, Kaczmarski, Stanislawski, 2008). As
Peake (2004: 17) accounts for the experiences of the first international police offi-
cers, what many of them found frustrating was not the difficulty of policing with
limited resources, but the fact that they were working in a wholly alien political and
cultural context. A great number of police officers of UNMIK police has not achi-
eved experience of working in an ambient of divided ethnicities, and their lingui-
stic incompetence made direct communication with the diverse local population
impossible. 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX, http://www.
eulex-kosovo.eu ) is a civil mission with a central aim to assist and support the Ko-
sovo authorities in of the area of law enforcement, especially in the police, judici-
ary and customs segments and has a unified chain of command to Brussels. Final
staff will consist of around 3,000 persons (1,900 international and 1,100 local). It
is a technically oriented mission, in charge of supervision, monitoring and counse-
ling, retaining simultaneously a certain amount of limited executive jurisdictions.
The police component of EULEX has at its disposal 1,400 international policemen
in total, and they tend to be located throughout Kosovo. In accordance with its
tasks, the personnel is structured into three departments: The Department for
Strengthening, The Executive Police Department, The Department of Special Poli-
ce. The judiciary component is made of about 10 % from the total number of
EULEX staff, or ca. 300 employees. Within this number, about 70 of them work in
the prison system and there are circa 40 judges and circa 20 prosecutors. Customs
service will count 27 international and 19 local representatives. 
The Kosovo Force (KFOR, http://www.nato.int/kfor) is a NATO-led internati-
onal force responsible to “take all necessary action to establish and maintain a se-
cure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission.” It
is mandated under Resolution 1244 to: (a) respond promptly to any violations and
restore compliance, using military force if required, (b) establish liaison arrange-
ments with local Kosovo authorities, and with FRY/Serbian civil and military aut-
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horities, and (c) observe, monitor, and inspect any and all facilities or activities in
Kosovo that the international security force commander believes have or might ha-
ve military or police capability. KFOR’s mandate and objectives (UNSC, 1999) al-
locate its responsibility for: deterring hostilities and enforcing the cease ?re, demi-
litarizing the KLA, establishing a secure environment for the returning refugees,
ensuring public safety, de-mining, supporting the international civil presence, con-
ducting border monitoring, and ensuring freedom of movement. While in June
1999 KFOR comprised about 50,000 troops, since 2007 KFOR consisted of appro-
ximately 14,000 troops, currently KFOR makes 5.800 members from 29 countri-
es.
Paramilitary structures. Besides this legal structure, a network of illegal, pa-
ramilitary organizations is constantly maintained in Kosovo (Djurić, 2007). Acco-
unting for the process of transforming the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the
midst of 1999, the analysts of the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2000) observe
that after the formal demilitarization (see http://www.nato.int/koSovo), too, the ac-
tivities and influence of this paramilitary organization’s former members have con-
tinued in “four pillars”: political (KLA supporters have formed their own political
party – the Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo – PDPK), military (joining the
composition of the newly-formed agency Kosovo Protection Corps) and police (en-
tering the membership of Kosovo Police Service). After the war, a part of the for-
mer members of KLA has joined activities connected with organized crime and vi-
olence. Public appearance and timely generated incidents (patrolling of persons in
black uniforms, inspecting and identifying of passers-by Gashi (2007), even the in-
cidents with disarmament of policemen, public announcements3 and their respon-
sibility for the accidents caused) by armed members of various informal groups in
the post-war Kosovo, all attest to the continuation of the agency of paramilitary or-
ganizations. In a Report from the Special Research Project of the IWPR “KLA Un-
der Scrutiny,” we are reminded that the international community “began openly
talking about the links between the protectorate's civil defense force, the Kosovo
Protection Corps, and the militant Albanian group the Albanian National Army,
ANA, which aims to rid Kosovo of its remaining Serb population” (Miftari and Qu-
in, 2003). The fact that a large number of separate military organizations have been
formed in the post-war Kosovo is confirmed by the International Crisis Group re-
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3 In their public announcement, published in a daily newspaper in Albanian, the paramilitary orga-
nization “Black Eagles” threatened that the further ignorance of Kosovo Albanians' claims would “result
in the re-organization of KLA’s guerrilla structures as a guarantee for implementation of a sovereign and
independent state.” “Po na humbet durimi, thone ‘Shqiponjat’” [Our patience is running out, say the
‘Eagles’], Epoka e Re (February 18, 2005).
port, which states, among other things, that “these military and ex-military grou-
pings are only loosely connected with each other.” (ICG, 2005: 8-9). 
And others… Additionally to those mentioned above, there exists an additio-
nal network of multifarious intelligence services4 as well as a long-term rivalry bet-
ween two competitive intelligence services – the Kosovo Information Agency
(Agjencia Informative e Kosovлs – AIK) and the Kosovo National Information Servi-
ce (Kombлtar Shлrbimi Informativ e Kosovлs – KSHIK) – which all contributes to the
extreme complexity of the security architecture of the post-war Kosovo. Both intelli-
gence services were active during the war (KSHIK within KLA, and AIK within
FARK, rival paramilitary formations organized under the sponsorship of Ibrahim Ru-
gova), and after the war they have transformed into the aids of two concurrent politi-
cal parties: LDK of Ibrahim Rugova and PDK of Hashim Thaqi. Albanian analysts
(Dugolli and Peci, 2006: 4) consider the thesis that the third strongest political party
AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo), led by Ramush Haradinaj, has also similar
structures, yet less personnel and equipment. Thus, the mission and the relationship
between these groups, if any, is not entirely clear, and their activities are only thought
to range from a close protection of party officials to gathering information and intimi-
dating political opponents.
3.2. Security neuralgic points
In spite of numerous and complex structure of the current security configuration,
the post-war Kosovo encounters many problems regarding personal and collective se-
curity, the increase of crime rate, permanently bad inter-ethnic relations, etc. Recapitu-
lating the most significant security problems there, Jones, Wilson, Rathmell and Riley
(2005:28) find out that three challenges are fundamental challenges: organized crime,
expressed through people and drug trafficking and weapons smuggling. As the second
important problem, they quote corruption of the public officials, claiming that organi-
zed crime and corruption are frequently interconnected in Kosovo. As they think, the
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4 After the war, the following were active in this area: Intelligence Agency of Kosovo (AIK), Natio-
nal Intelligence Service of Kosovo (KSHIK), Albanian National Service, “Eagle Eye”, Albanian National
Secret Service, Albanian National Security, Fighters and Protectors of Albanian National Territories. In ad-
dition, the Intelligence Section of the Chief Headquarters (G-2), known under the name of SHIU (Shлrbim
Informativ Ushtarak) within the KPC is also involved in intelligence activities. A part of their staff is ma-
de up of individuals from the KLA Military Police, who had been involved in intelligence work both be-
fore and during the war. Within the Kosovo Police Service, a body was set up for intelligence work – the
KPS Intelligence Service (Shлrbim Informativ SHPK); see Djurić (2007) “The Kosovo Liberation Army
in Transition”. Albanian analysts cite as “a completely certain fact” that the Serbian intelligence also ope-
rates within the territory of Kosovo, too, and they explain it in the following way: “Involvement in these
?elds is a demonstration of Serbia’s political campaign to maintain ‘parallel structures’ in Kosovo, as much
as to gather intelligence.”; see Dugolli and Peci (2006: 14).
third fundamental security challenge is to integrate the Serb and ethnic Albanian po-
pulations in Kosovo. 
Numerous politically motivated assassinations, committed under unclear circum-
stances and unsolved till now, have, in some post-war periods, been more strongly fo-
cused than the usual problems with minorities’ safety. In the first period, there was a
problem of conflicts among the Albanians, and, for a time, a degree of animosity to-
wards the international institutions and their representatives in the province. It is hard
to estimate the correct number of attacks on LDK officials. In any case, the number of
assassinations is high and in the ICG Report it is said that: “Nearly all went unsolved
but were generally attributed to the KLA and its successors.” (ICG, 2005: 15). A sig-
nificant part of the political life in the province has roots in crime since there are de-
batable finance sources and ties between political structures and criminal gangs are
strong, particularly at the local level. As it is reported in a research Geneva-based
Small Arms Survey (Khakee and Florquin, 2003: viii-ix), political and criminal vio-
lence in Kosovo is becoming interlinked through increasingly well-organized crime
structures, and business, organized crime, regular and extremist politics are intertwi-
ned in multifarious ways. Analysts also emphasize that the links between political cor-
ruption and organized crime are coupled by a weak enforcement of law and serious se-
curity problems for Kosovo (KIPRED, 2006b: 6).
A further deterioration of security sensation in the population of Kosovo is recor-
ded in the latest UNDP survey, too (UNDP Kosovo, 2009: 6). And, while most of the
interviewees during the day always or usually feel worried and anxious (only 8 % of
Kosovo Serbs and 14 % of Albanians have not the sensation of worry), the grounds for
their concern differ between the ethnic communities. The main reasons for the Alba-
nians’ concern are of economic nature, but the fear from the Serbs is also dominant.
The crucial problems in the domain of security are as follows: 
Interethnic relations. Twelve years after the termination of the war, Kosovo still
exists as a divided society with a minimal interaction between the majority Albanian
and the minority Serb community. Serbian and Albanian communities in the post-war
Kosovo live in parallel worlds. The Serbs inhabit enclaves, and educate their children
in a parallel school system sponsored by Serbia. It might be said that, the Serbs are al-
most entirely abstinent from any role in the economic, political and institutional life of
Kosovo. The process of their integration into the post-war Kosovo, so frequently emp-
hasized, is marked only by minor steps.
Shortly after the end of the bombing campaign from 1999, about 200,000 Serbs
have left Kosovo, and the process of their repatriation turned into an almost complete
fiasco. Circa 40 % from the assessed 100–140,000 remnant Serbs inhabit the northern
part of Kosovo, at a compact territory, and the other 60 % live in three larger commu-
nities: in the central part of Kosovo (in a number of settlements around the capital of
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Priština), at the south-east of Kosovo (in villages near the towns of Gnjilane, Kosov-
ska Kamenica and Novo Brdo) and in the south (Štrpce), as well as in a number of
smaller communities dispersed in the Metohija area (around the city of Peć). Northern
Mitrovica is the only city inhabited by the Kosovo Serbs, and in some way it occupi-
es the position of the informal Serbian capital in the region. During the past years, the
Serbian communities there have kept administrative structures sponsored by Belgra-
de, with their function in the fields of justice, education, health care, administration po-
stal service. Kosovo Serbs make their living mostly by an income they get from the
Serbian state funds. Summarizing the results of numerous public opinion polls conduc-
ted among Kosovo Serbs after the war, it might be appraised that, for them, the pro-
blem of security perpetuates as a major problem, and that they have distinguished li-
mited movement or inability to move freely within Kosovo, lack of personal safety and
a general lack of rule of law as the greatest obstacles (KIPRED, 2006b: 31).
The most difficult task of the civil administration in the province has been to ke-
ep the two main ethnic groups separated and to establish a safe environment in which
all ethnic groups can live together peacefully. Failure is evident from the continuity of
ethnically motivated violence carried out by the Albanian majority over the Serbian
minority. A campaign against the Serbs that took place in March 2004 yielding, cer-
tainly, the most intensive confirmation of the minority’s discrimination. In two days of
riots that spread throughout the Kosovo’s municipalities, 19 people were killed, 954
wounded, and 4,100 displaced. On top of that, 730 houses were damaged and 36 Ort-
hodox churches, monasteries and other religious sites were burned, looted or dama-
ged. More than 50,000 Albanians took part in these disturbances (Baskin, 2006). The
UN International Police, Kosovo Police Service (KPS), Kosovo Force (KFOR) did not
do a lot to deter the rioters. 
In its report for 2006, the Commission of the European Communities cites that,
although the security condition and the freedom of movement for the minorities has
somewhat improved, “minority communities, mostly Serbs and Roma, face discrimi-
nation, serious restrictions in freedom of movement, access to education, health care,
public utilities and social assistance due to the poor quality of services and security
concerns. The overall implementation of the anti-discrimination law is unsatisfactory.
Kosovo Serbs continue to be subject to incidents such as harassment and intimidation.”
(CEC, 2006: 14-15). The discrimination of the Kosovo Serbs, Roma, Askalia and
Egyptian communities occurs in the spheres of employment, social services, usage of
language, freedom of movement, the right to return, and, in 2008 a growth in violen-
ce and other crimes against minorities and their property is recorded (Bureau of De-
mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009). 
All this happens in the context of one of Europe’s most progressive counter-di-
scriminative legal solutions. Namely, in 2004 the Kosovo Law against Discrimination
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No. 2004/32, was declared by UNMIK Regulation (UNMIK, 2004b), which establis-
hed the prohibition of discrimination forms, and, in contrast to the available legal so-
lutions, it offers a special protection to minority communities and introduces measures
of affirmative action. Regulations which define the official use of language in Kosovo
foresee the equal application of Serbian. However, as it is the case in the bulk of offi-
cial documents, orthography and terminology mistakes in the Serbian version of this
law are so numerous that they frustrate any attempt to comprehend the meaning of this
text. Judicial analysts rightly consider that this error represents discrimination, but al-
so that it seriously affects the rights of the non-Albanophone persons from Kosovo to
know more about their rights and duties within this legal system (Matijević, 2007:
33–39). Even ten years after the end of war conflicts, both the greatest communities in
Kosovo – Albanian and Serbian – continue to live separately, and they do not manifest
any serious will to accept the other side (in the case of Albanians) or the integration
into the Kosovo society (in the case of Kosovo Serbs). Following the findings of sur-
veys in 2008 and 2009, the ethnical distance which Kosovo Albanians show towards
Kosovo Serbs increases. In comparison with 2008, their willingness to work with the
Kosovo Serbs has decreased for entire 22 percent, now amounting up to 33 % now. At
the same time, the percent of Serbs willing to work with Albanians is 48 (UNDP Ko-
sovo, 2008).
Corruption. Corruption is a problem evident in all important segments of social
life, and is “still widespread at all levels and little progress has been made in tackling
corruption.” (CEC, 2006: 12). Analysts find it both among the members of the local
elite and among the members of UNMIK. In the analysis of the corruption, widely
common among the Kosovo politicians too, the researchers have found that it has a cul-
tural and social dimension. Strong family ties, and the fact that the rural populations
continue to live in extended families are conducive to nepotism and clientelism. The
widespread presence of corruption among the members of UNMIK is explained by
unclear division of their competences, as well as the mission’s immunity, which serio-
usly hampers its capability for self-control (Balcer et al., 2008: 56, 84). The UNMIK
office for supervision regularly investigates the level of corruption in the UNMIK and
criminal justice system, while corruption by members of security forces, especially the
border police of the KPS, is comprehensively being investigated. Public opinion also
shares the opinion that corruption is widespread in the institutions of the provisional
local self-government and UNMIK. In 2008, the emphasis was on corruption in go-
vernment, the local judiciary (partiality in proceedings, delaying of processes), and se-
curity forces (first of all, the customs office). Analysis of the relevant institutions po-
ints out that the existing institutional legal framework intended to deal with corruption
is not clear, thus recommending several anticorruption laws and improvement of their
implementation, referring to a weak judicial system as the key obstacle in combating
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corruption (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009: 28). The percep-
tion of corruption as a major social problem continues to be strong in the public opi-
nion of Kosovo. In a survey conducted in 2009 (UNDP Kosovo, 2009: 5), it ranges
among five most important problems of Kosovo, and institutions mostly suspected of
“large scale” corruption are: KEK (Korporata Energjetike e Kosovлs – Energy Corpo-
ration of Kosovo), KTA (Kosovo Trust Agency), Customs, PTK (Post and Telecom of
Kosovo) and Central Administration. 
Illegal possession of weapons. Experts estimate that Kosovo's inhabitants possess
some 400,000 pieces of illegal weapons (Istrefi, Richards, Rynn, Smith, Sokolovб,
2007). In the course of 2003, the UNDP launched a three-month amnesty for those
who surrendered their weapons, which resulted in the yielding of 155 pieces of fire
arms. Analysts consider that the reasons for this failure is a combination of distrust of
the security forces, suspicion of corruption among the local officials and, distrust to the
local law officers and NATO troops, a low murder and other hard crimes clearance ra-
te and a lack of confidence in the international community and their intentions. The
current situation is assessed as deriving from a growing culture of violence which
Priština sociologists explain in the following manner: “Kosovar Albanian society is
witnessing a rise in violence at home, in schools and in sport, there's a fascination with
militarism and army folklore is starting to dominate the local culture.” (Mustafa, Xha-
ra, 2003). 
Trafficking in human beings. Since the end of the armed conflict in 1999, Koso-
vo has experienced an increase in both adult and child trafficking for the purpose of
prostitution (Roopnaraine, 2002). According to institutional reports, Kosovo is a sour-
ce, transit, and destination point for trafficked people, and internal trafficking is a gro-
wing problem. Victims have been women and children trafficked internally or from
Eastern Europe and other Balkan countries into Kosovo, primarily for commercial se-
xual exploitation, but also for domestic servitude or forced labor in bars and restau-
rants. Victims were also trafficked through Kosovo to Albania, Macedonia, Montene-
gro, and countries in Western Europe (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and La-
bor, 2009).
General picture of crime in Kosovo is burdened with frequent criminal offenses,
kidnapping with request for ransom, the smuggling of drugs, petrol derivates, tobac-
co, street petty crime, and increased thefts and robberies. Describing the circumstan-
ces in the area of the city of Peć, Albanian analysts (Xharra, Hajrullahu, Salihu, 2005)
appraise that in this region, law and order has broken down and shootings have beco-
me a part of the fabric of life. Acts of violence are prompted by a variety of motives,
ranging from rivalries left over from the politics of the Kosovo conflict, through orga-
nized crime and business disputes, to tit-for-tat blood feuds. It is sometimes hard to tell
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where one type ends and the other starts, but the overall picture is like that of a gan-
gland culture holding the rest of society hostage.
The research on the diffusion of weapons in Kosovo conducted by UNDP shows
that the great deal of illegal weapons is in possession by the population of Peć, Đakovi-
ca and Dečani, i. e. Metohija (UNDP Kosovo, 2004). The report also observes that the
price of weapons is much lower than in the central and eastern regions, which attests
to the saturation of the weapon market. All this, in addition to retaining the dominant-
ly traditional relations in social communication, has induced the Western analysts to
ascribe a “Sicilian aroma” to the Metohija region. Some analysts classify Kosovo
among the top regions with the high level of organized crime and claim that the Koso-
vo’s organized crime structures are among the most powerful in Europe. They see one
of the causes for such a condition are strong and hermetic family structures and the
presence of a Kosovar diaspora in Western Europe, as well as the high level of corrup-
tion among the local elite (Balcer et al., 2008: 84).
Traditionally, Kosovo is connected with drug smuggling. It is estimated that 80
% of heroin destined for Western markets goes through Kosovo where there are seve-
ral labs for refining the narcotic raw material (Jones et al., 2005: 28). The recently pu-
blished UNDOC report warns about the network of criminals, politicians and dubio-
us businessmen that complicates police efforts to cut off the smuggling routes. The
authors of the report of the Commission of the European Communities for 2006, too,
state that Kosovo is located on a heroin trafficking route and the consumption continu-
es to increase (CEC, 2006: 37).
There is also a constant problem of customary blood feuds among Albanian fa-
milies, resulting in the in-shutting of feuding families into house confinements and
years of exhausting concatenations of revenge-taking (Bytiqi, 2004). Numerous NGOs
warn about a rise in domestic violence that is rarely reported, due to traditional attitu-
des towards woman.
Concluding remarks
Despite the fact that it derives solely from the data and analyses of international
and Albanian institutions and authors, the present overview of the basic parameters of
social life in postwar Kosovo and Metohija cannot seem to support a positive evalua-
tion of the current situation and optimism about a rapid progress. The presented ma-
terial does not indicate a quick development of the civil society with institutions that
could provide personal security, respect for legal norms, conditions for doing regular
business activities, the exercise of social rights, proper infrastructure and, in general,
all state functions required to sustain a normal life of a European society at the begin-
ning of the 21th century.
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On a very practical level, post-1999 Kosovo appears to be a field of numerous
challenges and pitfalls for all actors: the international community, Albanians and Ser-
bia. Ambitious goals of international community in the post-war Kosovo have compri-
sed the conduction of voluminous multi-faceted transition which have to be implemen-
ted in the future: finding a new status for the former province, establishing parliamen-
tary democracy, transition from the post-conflict underdeveloped economy to a system
of market economy and sustainable economic development, transformation of complex
guerilla security infrastructure into a civil peacetime system of security forces, pa-
cifying inter-ethnic tensions and establishing the multi-ethnic society. 
The studied pieces of research presented in this paper show several problems of
the Kosovo society are, quite clearly, like in other transition countries or emerging de-
mocracies. Twelve years after the termination of the war in Kosovo and the establis-
hment of the international protectorate, it can be ascertained that only the first among
all the proclaimed goals is fully achieved (finding a new status for the former provin-
ce). By analyzing the presented elements of social life, the conclusions can be drawn
that the achievements in social reconstruction are modest whilst in the field of recon-
ciling of the antagonistic ethnic groups huge challenges will have to be met (Đurić,
Kešetović, Meško, 2009). However, even twelve years from the conflict termination
and four from the declaration of independence, Kosovo gets very slowly closer to the
establishment of the market economy and multi-ethnic society in which all the citizens
should be (at least in theory) free. It seems that the realization of these goals is even
farther now than several years ago, when progressive withdrawal of international for-
ces was conceived. 
Building a new democratic state (and/or nation) in Kosovo is a challenge which
would most likely be left as a legacy for future generations. Kosovo today, along with
all other already specified problems typical for transitional states (organized crime, hu-
man trafficking etc.), stands confronted with a phenomena of a “weak state”, that is,
with fragile public administration, and it can be generally characterized as an anomic
post-war society. Established institutions, for the time being, don’t have enough capa-
city yet to provide the necessary conditions for social and economic prosperity in the
near future. 
The future would demand a lot of effort in putting into effect the reconciliation
between the Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo due to their ongoing mu-
tual ethnic tensions. Another problem can be the withdrawal or significant scaling
down of the international forces from Kosovo which can lead to even slower process
of achieving the proclaimed goals. The old institutional system is destroyed but a new
one has not been fully established and in function. International institutions retire the-
ir staff and the local Albanians do not seem to be qualified enough to autonomously
administer their new-born state. 
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In this work, I have outlined the major socio-economic trends because I think that
since the new status of Kosovo is established, a long-term focus has been put predo-
minantly on the political issues, while the region’s economic situation has remained
neglected. Any further detour from the planned development could move towards the
direction of social unease and even riots, caused by bad life conditions, increasing
unemployment, creation of a social underclass from a considerable part of population,
or by escalation of conflicts and even attacks on (or from) the remnant non-Albanian
population. This assumption is also supported by Tьtsch (2005: 56), who contends that
this picture generates a pessimistic prognosis of a widespread discontent, lack of per-
spectives, and frustration among the unemployed, combined with unfulfilled political
hopes, could favor social tensions and the likelihood of violent unrest, especially if it
is being instrumentalized by radical/extremist groups. The judgments of several Alba-
nian analysts are in the same vein – if the economy does not improve and if state in-
stitutions do not strengthen, it could become a fertile ground for religious fundamen-
talist groups (KIPRED, 2006b: 7). 
To conclude, the post-war Kosovo and Metohija is nowadays certainly a disorga-
nized society. Its Serbian population constantly decreases, the international institutions
progressively reduce their presence there, and the local Albanian institutions are still
not mature enough to sustain the newly proclaimed independency. It can be expected
that a further continuation of such a situation will likely lead to social unrests due to
the majority’s poor living conditions, high unemployment, and impoverishment, which
would, consequently, end up in the escalation of violence against the remaining non-
Albanian population in the region (Đurić, 2011). All this, together with the fact that
the Albanians now more openly express dissatisfaction with their status in the neig-
hboring territories (Macedonia, Greece, southern Serbia) and their freely expressed
demand for a union, can further challenge security in the wider region. Thus, an im-
portant way to keep this security is to intensify the thematization and other social re-
search of this important issue.
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Факултет безбедности  
КОСОВО И МЕТОХИЈА НАКОН РАТА
– ДРУШТВЕНИ И БЕЗБЕДНОСНИ ПАРАМЕТРИ
Циљ овог рада је да се синтетички прикажу најзначајнији параметри у кључним
сферама живота на Косову и Метохији. Након 1999. овај простор постаје позорница
бројних изазова и замки за све актере: међународну заједницу, Албанце и Србију. Два-
наест година након завршетка рата и успостављања међународног протектората,
Косово и Метохија се суочава са бројним проблемима, пре свега везаним за неодржи-
ву економију, високе стопе многих облика криминала, недовољно развијене институци-
је, те се генерално може означити као аномично постратно друштво. Преглед је за-
снован на секундарној анализи постојећих истраживања, као и података међународ-
них и албанских институција. 
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